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CERTIFICATION AFTER ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIALENGLISH
V. ARIZONA: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS'
PRACTICES
MOLLY THOMAS-JENSENt
INTRODUCTION

Certification of state law questions to state courts allows a dialogue
between federal and state courts over questions of common concern. The
process of certification generally involves a federal court sending a difficult or novel question of state law to that state's highest court, whereupon the state court responds with an answer that is authoritative. It does
not, however, require the federal court to relinquish jurisdiction over the
proceedings while the parties litigate the issue in state court. As a result,
certification has the potential to diminish tension between federal and
state courts' respective roles in a federalist system while improving efficiency and accessibility for litigants.
While certification is not without its critics, it has been an important
component of the federal courts' toolkit since the Supreme Court initially
endorsed the use of certification in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.1 In
the years since Clay, more states have adopted certification procedures
and more federal courts have relied upon certification when faced with
novel questions of state law. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,2 the Supreme Court expanded the role of certification when it directed lower courts to certify questions of state law in cases where previously they would have abstained under the Pullman doctrine-a doctrine which allows federal courts to abstain 3in certain cases involving
federal constitutional challenges to state laws.
In this article, I examine the development of certification law in the
years following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans for Official
English. This article seeks to determine whether federal appellate courts
have followed the Supreme Court's directive to certify when previously
they would have abstained pursuant to the Pullman doctrine. Specificalt A.B., Brown University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts provided by: Rishi Batra, Dario Borghesan, Richard Fallon, Alison
Kamhi, Mona Lewandoski, and Deborah Popowski.
1. 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Clay was a federal diversity case that involved a novel question of
Florida law. The Court commended the Florida Legislature for its "rare foresight" in passing a law
that allowed federal courts to certify questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 212.
2. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
Id.at 75-76. The Supreme Court first announced the Pullman doctrine in Railroad Com3.
mission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The doctrine is discussed more fully in Part 11
of this article.
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ly, this article catalogues the analytical frameworks federal courts use
when determining whether to certify a question of state law in a case that
presents Pullman considerations and assesses whether these frameworks
are consistent with Arizonans-and, as an intertwined inquiry, whether
they produce results that are consistent with Arizonans. After concluding
that the federal appellate courts' analytical approach to certification in
Pullman-type cases is inconsistent and frequently at odds with Arizonans, this article recommends that courts follow a formal framework that
promises analytical consistency and compliance with the directive of
Arizonans.
Since Arizonans for Official English, the Supreme Court has remained relatively silent on questions concerning when and whether to
certify. The Arizonans decision provided a relatively clear directivecertify when previously you would have abstained pursuant to Pullman
-but the federal appellate courts have not implemented this rule consistently or predictably. Both Pullman abstention and Arizonans certification promote federalism values such as comity, 4 but Arizonans certification nearly always improves judicial efficiency while reducing the parties' litigation time and costs. 5 By adopting a clear and consistent framework to analyze whether certification is appropriate in cases involving
Pullman considerations, the courts of appeals will provide valuable guidance to federal district courts. They will also promote the values that are
at the core of the Arizonans and Pullman decisions-namely, federalstate comity and the efficient use of both the judiciary's and litigants'
resources.
To provide a foundation for the discussion of the federal appellate
courts' implementation of Arizonans for Official English, Part I begins
with a description of the formation of the Pullman doctrine as well as the
Arizonans decision and its impact on the doctrine of Pullman abstention.
Part II discusses the doctrinal and pragmatic considerations that might
lead a court to find abstention preferable to certification, even after the
Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans. I conclude that there are relatively few considerations that should sway a court to abstain rather than
certify, but note that these considerations remain important and should
inform courts' analyses. With this framework in place, Part 1H provides
an overview of the federal appellate courts' approaches to analyzing
whether to abstain or certify in Pullman-type cases decided since Arizonans. The analysis has varied dramatically, from circuit to circuit, and
even within circuits. I conclude that the vast range of analytical approaches used by the federal appellate courts produces confusing case
4. See generally Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293 (2003) (describing a "crisis" in the balance between state courts and lower
federal courts and prescribing more federal court certification as one way to address the crisis in
comity).
5. See infra Part I.C.
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law that is often at odds with Arizonans. In Part IV, I propose an analytic
framework that has the potential to provide clarity and consistency to this
rather muddled field of law.
I. RAILROAD PORTERS AND THE LANGUAGE OF STATE GOVERNMENT: A
SUMMARY OF THE PULLMAN AND ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH

DECISIONS
6
A. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.

In 1941, the Supreme Court decided Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Pullman Co. The case involved a challenge to the Railroad Commission's decision to require that all sleeping cars operated on Texas rail
lines be continuously attended by Pullman conductors. 7 It had been the
Pullman Company's practice, on lesser-traveled routes with only one
sleeper car on a train, to staff the train with a Pullman porter rather than a
conductor. 8 As the United States Supreme Court explained, it was "well
known" that Pullman porters were African-American while Pullman
conductors were white. 9 The Pullman porters intervened in the lawsuit
brought by the Pullman Company challenging the Commission's order,
arguing that the order was "a discrimination against Negroes in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The cases also presented an unsettled
issue of state law, namely whether the Railroad Commission had the
power to issue the order that the Pullman Company and Pullman porters
were challenging. 1'
Rather than decide the constitutional issue,' 2 the Court turned instead to the state issue.' 3 The Court held that the federal district court,
when presented with the question of state law, should have "exercise[d]
its wise discretion by staying its hands."' 4 In explaining its decision, the
Court emphasized the "sensitive" nature of the constitutional issue and
determined that "[s]uch constitutional adjudication plainly can be
avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy." 5 In a nutshell, the Pullman doctrine today stands for the proposition that a federal court, when faced with a tough constitutional question that could be avoided if a state law question were decided in a certain way, should exercise its discretion to abstain from addressing the
state law question if it is difficult, sensitive, or relates to an important
6.
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7. Id. at 497-98.
8. Id. at 497.
9.
Id.
10. Id. at 498.
11.
Id. at 498-99.
12.
Note that the Court heard this case over a decade before deciding Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13.
See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
14.
Id.
15. Id. at 498.
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governmental function. 16 The federal court should then direct litigants to
bring their claims in state court, so that a state court may decide novel or
unsettled questions of state law. If the federal issue is not precluded by
the decision in the state court, the litigants may return to federal court for
17
the resolution of the case.
The doctrine of Pullman abstention remains an important limitation
on the role of federal courts. The principles underlying the Supreme
Court's directive to abstain from answering the state law question in
Pullman remain vital to ongoing discussions about the proper role of
federal courts, notably in that the opinion's reasoning relied upon the
Court's assessment that abstention could promote federal-state comity.
The Pullman Court emphasized that, at least in cases brought at equity,
an "unnecessary ruling" on a question of state law made by a federal
court would not further the "reign of law" if it were subsequently supplanted by a state court decision. 8 The Court also reasoned that such a
ruling might create friction between the federal and state systems. 19
This doctrine is not without limitations. The most relevant to this article is a policy against abstaining in cases in which plaintiffs seek to
vindicate First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has explained
that, "[i]n such case to force the plaintiff who has commenced a federal
action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the
impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect., 20 Federal appellate courts have generally followed this rule, and
have declined to abstain in cases involving allegations that a state law
21
violates the First Amendment.

16. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997):
Designed to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues, the Pullman mechanism remitted parties to the state courts for adjudication of the unsettled state-law issues. If settlement of the state-law question did not
prove dispositive of the case, the parties could return to the federal court for decision of
the federal issues.
For the purposes of this article, I refer to cases that present these characteristics-a federal challenge
to a state law that has not yet been interpreted by that state's highest court-as a case presenting or
involving "Pullmanconsiderations." This simply means that these are cases in which a court prior to
Arizonans would have looked to the Pullman decision and weighed these factors before determining,
in its discretion, whether abstention was proper.
17. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,421-22 (1964).
18. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
19. Id.
20. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
378-79 (1964) ("We also cannot ignore that abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in
many courts.... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time,..
. a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms." (citations omitted)).
21.
See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.
1998) ("If abstention is normally unwarranted where an allegedly overbroad state statute, challenged
facially, will inhibit allegedly protected speech, it is even less appropriate here, where such speech
has been specifically prohibited. Abstention would risk substantial delay while Bad Frog litigated its
state law issues in the state courts."); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1184 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("Ab-
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Subsequent cases have determined Pullman's applicability to new
situations, including claims that invoke federal statutes rather than the
federal constitution, 22 civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,23 instances in which the federal court abstains and the state court
decides both the state and the federal issues, 24 and cases involving any
type of discretionary relief.25 In the process, the Supreme Court has ensured the longevity and continued relevance of the Pullman doctrine.
26
B. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona

In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona. The Court relied upon a line of cases supporting the federal
courts' use of state law certification procedures in holding that the federal court should have certified the central state law issue. 27 This holding
established a new set of rules for courts faced with cases that involve
Pullman considerations.
Arizonans involved a federal constitutional challenge to an amendment to the Arizona Constitution that declared English to be Arizona's
official language and "the language of ... all government functions and
actions., 28 A state employee, Maria-Kelly Yniguez, working as an insurance claims manager for the state's Department of Administration
brought suit in federal court against the State of Arizona, Arizona's governor, and several other state officials. 29 She claimed that the Arizona
amendment violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

stention is to be invoked particularly sparingly in actions involving alleged deprivations of First
Amendment rights ... ").
22. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490, 492 (1949) (holding that Pullman abstention was not appropriate to avoid the decision of sensitive non-constitutional issues).
23. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 169, 176-77 (1959) (holding that Pullman
abstention is appropriate in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 provides a cause of
action for many plaintiffs alleging federal constitutional violations. It provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
24.
See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964) (holding
that, when the state court addresses both state and federal issues, the federal plaintiff is bound by res
judicata only if the plaintiff "voluntarily . . . and fully litigated his federal claims in the state
courts").

25. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719, 731 (1996) (discussing general
principles of abstention and noting "we have recognized that the authority of a federal court to
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant
or deny relief").
26.

520 U.S. 43 (1997).

27. Id. at 77 (citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S 383, 393-96 (1988);
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)).
28.
Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1(1)-(2)).
29.
Id. at 48-50.
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Constitution. 30 Yniguez, who was fluent in both Spanish and English,
alleged that her work handling medical malpractice claims required significant interactions with the public and that, when working with members of the public who only spoke Spanish, she spoke with them in Spanish.3 1 She brought suit because she believed that her Spanish-language
interactions might lead to the termination of her employment or other
sanctions, and she requested injunctive and declaratory relief that the
Arizona amendment violated the U.S. Constitution.3 2
Prior to trial, the Arizona Attorney General issued an official opinion that the amendment to the Arizona Constitution must be read to
apply only to "official acts of government," and therefore that it did not
apply to "the delivery of governmental services., 33 The attorney general
reached this conclusion, at least in part, because he was obliged to read
this amendment "in line. . . 'with the United States Constitution.' 34 The
Arizona Attorney General had asked both the district court and the court
of appeals "to seek, through [Arizona's] certification process, an authoritative construction of the new measure from the Arizona Supreme
Court., 35 Despite the Arizona Attorney General's opinion and request for
certification, both the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to certify the issue
to the Arizona Supreme Court and found that the amendment was "fatally overbroad. 36
The U.S. Supreme Court chastised the lower courts for failing to
certify to the Arizona Supreme Court the issue of the proper construction
of the constitutional amendment. The Court declared that "[c]ertification
today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called 'Pullman abstention.' 37 The Court emphasized that federal courts should not
reach constitutional questions unless necessary to resolve the case. The
Court reasoned that the Arizona Attorney General's actions in this
case-namely, issuing an opinion that indicated Yniguez's actions were
not unlawful under the Arizona amendment and requesting that the district court and the court of appeals certify the issue to the Arizona Supreme Court-suggested that the constitutional issue might be easily
avoided by a narrowing construction of the Arizona amendment. 38 Indeed, the Court's opinion notes that the amendment's sponsors affirmed
at oral argument before the Court that the attorney general's narrow construction was the correct one-and this construction, all parties seemed
30.

Id. at 50.

31.

Id.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 52 (quoting Op.Att'y Gen. No. 189-009 (1989)).
Id. (quoting Op.Att'y Gen. No. 189-009 (1989)).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 54-55, 62.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 75, 77.
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to agree, would avoid the constitutional issue presented by this case.39
Finally, the Court noted that this question was particularly appropriate
for the state courts to decide because it touched upon a matter of "importance to the conduct of Arizona's business. ' 4°
In determining that the lower federal courts should have certified
the state law issue to the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizonans Court
noted that Pullman abstention was "[a]ttractive in theory" but "protracted
'4
and expensive in practice. A
The Court emphasized, by comparison, the
virtues of certification, inasmuch as it "allows a federal court faced with
a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assur-

ance of gaining an authoritative response.'42 The Court relied upon previous cases in which it had found certification the appropriate course of
action 43 -most notably, Bellotti v. Baird,44 which held certification to be
appropriate in a federal constitutional challenge to a state law restricting
access to abortion.45 Today, Arizonans for Official English stands for the
idea that federal courts should certify where previously they would have
abstained under the Pullman doctrine.46
C. The Relative Merits of Certification
As Arizonans for Official English emphasized,47 Pullman abstention

involves considerable expense to litigants, lengthens the litigation timeline, and makes inefficient use of judicial resources. 48 In a 1977 law review article, Martha Field summarized the problems associated with abstention:
[E]xtreme delays inherent in the abstention procedure, and the attendant expense, have been chronicled many times. Essentially, the parties to a case in which abstention is ordered must undergo two law39.
40.
41.
42.
may be

Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. Note that certification is not limited to Pullman-type situations. Indeed, certification
an appropriate option in federal cases not invoking federal question jurisdiction. See

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1201 (5th ed. 2003) (describing cases prior to Arizo-

nansfor Official English, in which the Supreme Court endorsed the use of certification in cases not
involving federal constitutional challenges to state laws).
43.
See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76.
44.
428 U.S. 132 (1976).
45.
Id. at 151:
The importance of speed in resolution of the instant litigation is manifest. Each day the
statute is in effect, irretrievable events, with substantial personal consequences, occur.
Although we do not mean to intimate that abstention would be improper in this case were
certification not possible, the availability of certification greatly simplifies the analysis.
46.
See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 75. Note, however, that Arizonans had
other holdings unrelated to the abstention/certification issue. See id. at 64-67 (standing); id. at 68-71
(mootness).
47.
Id. at 77.
48. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 591 (1977).
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suits instead of one, because their cause is bifurcated between state
and federal courts. When a federal court abstains in an action before
it, the plaintiffs must commence a new lawsuit in state trial court,
usually a declaratory judgment action, to have the unclear issue of
state law resolved. They must work their way up through the state
appellate system, usually without getting any priority on crowded
state dockets, before the state issue is settled, so that they can return
to the federal system for resolution of federal issues, with the attendant appeals. The prospect is hardly a happy one for litigants. It may
deter them from seeking a federal forum in the first instance, or it
may, once abstention is ordered, induce them to cut their costs by
presenting all issues to the state court for decision 49and waiving their
right to return to federal court on the federal issues.
While certification is generally more efficient and entails less delay
than abstention, the procedure is not without its critics. 50 Nevertheless,
faced with a choice between certification and abstention, certification
will almost always be the speedier, more efficient, and most cost-

effective option.51
Some who criticize certification (and abstention, for that matter)
have questioned whether these procedures actually promote federal-state
comity, as their supporters claim.52 For instance, in an article criticizing
what he viewed as the overuse and misuse of certification, Judge Selya
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, "In the end, I believe that it
engenders more understanding, and a healthier respect for state courts
and what they do, when federal courts tackle the complexities of state
law head on." 53 Others, such as Jonathan Remy Nash, question whether
certification is consistent with the constitutional and statutory limits on

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Bruce M. Selya, CertifiedMadness: Ask a Silly Question .. 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 677 passim (1995). But see Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification(at Last) in North
Carolina,58 DUKE L.J. 69, 77-81 (2008) (noting that a well-drafted certification procedure, combined with the state's highest court's judicious use of its discretion, could avoid many of the pitfalls
of certification).
51.
See, e.g., Rebecca A. Cochran, FederalCourt Certificationof Questions of State Law to
State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 217 (2003) (cataloguing delays
of over one year in Ohio's response to certified questions, but noting that "even waiting a year for an
answer to a certified question answer pales when compared to the time elapsed under abstention");
Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, InteractiveJudicialFederalism: Certified Questions in New
York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 397 (2000) (noting that New York courts have generally responded
to certified questions of law within six months of accepting the certified question); see also Jonathan
Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1672, 1698 (2003) ("[Cjertification avoids procedural complications that might hinder the state court
system's resolution of the state law question were abstention employed."). But see Selya, supra note
50, at 688 (noting that both certification and abstention require "piecemeal litigation spanning two
separate court systems-and such divisions are notoriously inefficient").
52. See, e.g., Selya, supra note 50, at 684-87 (emphasizing that certification is a one-way
street and noting that to allow state courts to certify questions of federal law to federal courts would
undermine the constitutional role of state courts in the federal system).
53.
See id. at 687.
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federal jurisdiction. 54 Nash has argued that certification "raises serious
and that its "jurisdictional underpinquestions of federal jurisdiction,"
55
weak.
inherently
are
nings"
Additionally, some judges and practitioners have been critical of the
results that certification produces in practice. Several commentators have
noted that problems arise when federal courts do not "artfully present[]"
the questions that they wish answered. 56 Other commentators have criticized state courts when they dismiss a certified question without explanation, arguing that "a brief, reasoned opinion when declining to answer
would help avoid federal court frustration and misinterpretation of silence, as well as expressly enforce the policies and practice of [state]
certification. 57 Judge Selya has argued that "the advisory nature of certified questions poses a psychological barrier to enthusiastic engagement
with the issues. 58 State courts are not given jurisdiction over the cases in
which questions are certified to them, 59 but their answers are binding on
the federal court and on future litigants. 60 Judge Selya concludes that this
lack of jurisdiction and the resulting "psychological barrier" leads state
courts to treat the certified issue differently than they would if it were a
live case or controversy that had worked its way through the state court
system.61

Despite these criticisms of both the theory and practical problems
underlying certification, it is generally accepted that certification is preferable to the lengthy and expensive process associated with abstention. a2
Nash, supra note 51, at 1672 (concluding that certification can be understood under both a
54.
"unitary" and a "binary" conception, but that neither framework can provide a full foundation for
both constitutional and statutory jurisdiction).
55.
See id. at 1748-49.
56. Selya, supra note 50, at 689; see also Cochran, supra note 51, at 198 (noting that most
questions certified to the Ohio Supreme Court failed to meet the court's requirement that the certified question be a pure question of law); Kaye & Weissman, supra note 51, at 404-414 (outlining
cases in which the New York Court of Appeals declined to answer certified questions).
Cochran, supra note 51, at 179; see also Selya, supra note 50, at 681-82; Richard Alan
57.
Chase, Note, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions: Are Inferences Permitted?, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 407,422 (1992).

Selya, supra note 50, at 682.
58.
59. But see Nash, supra note 51, at 1675:
First, the unitary conception applies when a federal court that certifies a question to a
state high court is understood to transfer the very case that is before it (or some portion
thereof) to the state court. The state court considers and responds to the questions of state
law, whereupon the federal court regains control of the case. Under this conception, there
is one, unitary case, with jurisdiction shifting from the federal court to the state court and
then back to the federal court.
17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
60.
JURISDICTION 3d §4248 (2007 & Supp. 2009).

61.
Selya, supra note 50, at 682.
62. See, e.g., id. at 688 (arguing that both certification and abstention are problematic and that
federal courts should "abjur[e]" from piecemeal litigation, but not disputing the claim that certification, as compared to abstention, is somewhat more efficient); see also Kaye & Weissman, supra note
51, at 384-85:
Supreme Court support for certification has been widely echoed. In 1967, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Certification
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And, given the Supreme Court's strong endorsement of the use of certification in Pullman-type cases, 63 it appears that, for these cases at least,
certification is here to stay.
I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH A COURT MIGHT CHOOSE TO ABSTAIN
RATHER THAN CERTIFY

The consensus among commentators appears to be that, when
choosing between abstention and certification, federal courts ought to
choose the latter, both for doctrinal and pragmatic reasons. 64 Why, then,
would any court abstain, given the very tangible advantages of certification and the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of the certification
process? This section details those scenarios in which a court may decide
to abstain without contravening the Supreme Court's directive in Arizonans for Official English. These procedures are necessarily intertwined:
as more courts certify in Pullman-type cases, it follows that courts should
resort to Pullman abstention with decreasing frequency.
Federal courts' doctrine provides several scenarios in which a federal court should abstain rather than certify. In PennhurstState School &
Hospital v. Halderman,65 the Supreme Court expanded its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence to hold that a federal court could not enjoin a
state official from violating state law. 66 If a federal court certified a question of state law to the state's highest court in order to avoid a federal
constitutional issue under Arizonans and Pullman, the Pennhurst doctrine would nevertheless prevent the federal court from granting injunctive relief if the state court's response made clear that a state official's
actions were not consistent with state law. In that scenario, the court
would not need to reach the federal constitutional issue, because of the
state court's response; but it would also be unable to grant an injunction
ordering the state official to comply with state law. In other words, certification for Pullman reasons cannot deal with the Pennhurst problem,
and the parties would need to re-litigate the issue in state courts. In such
of Questions of Law Act.... In 1969, the American Law Institute chimed in with its
support, as did the American Bar Association in 1977. In 1992, the National Conference
on State-Federal Judicial Relationships suggested that certification could enhance judicial federalism, and in 1995, the Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States
Judicial Conference recommended that states without certification procedures adopt
them.
63.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-80; see also Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976) (emphasizing the virtues of certification in a federal constitutional
challenge to a state law that had not been interpreted by the state's highest court); Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (emphasizing relative merits of certification when a diversity
case presents an unclear issue of state law).
64. See sources cited supra note 62.
65. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Specifically, Pennhurst created an exception to the rule established in
Ex parte Young. Id. at 105-06. Young held that, even though the Eleventh Amendment barred suits
against the states, plaintiffs could sue state officials seeking relief against state action. Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Pennhurst limited Young's reach, and thus limited the exception to the Eleventh Amendment's reach.
66. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 117.
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a situation, certification is inadequate, and the federal court would need
to abstain while the state court addressed the state law issues and determined whether an injunction would be appropriate relief.
An example of this Pullman-Pennhurstscenario arose in University
of Utah v. Shurtleff.7 In Shurtleff, the United States District Court for the
District of Utah heard a case brought by the University of Utah against
the state attorney general. The University sought equitable relief and a
judgment that the University's firearm policy banning concealed weapons was: (1) protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, (2) protected by a provision of the Utah Constitution
that purported to give autonomy to the University, and (3) not actually in
conflict with the state's concealed weapons laws. 68 The court found that
the Pennhurst decision would prevent it from granting the requested
equitable relief--enforcement of state law against a state official. 69 Ultimately, the court decided to dismiss the state law claims against Utah's
attorney general because of the Eleventh Amendment protections an70
As to the remaining federal claim, the court
nounced in Pennhurst.
noted that it was left with "jurisdiction over a meaty federal constitutional claim that could be rendered moot by a favorable state court decision
on either of [the] state law claims." ' 71 Citing Pullman and other cases for
the principle that questions of state law should be resolved before proceeding to substantial federal constitutional questions, the court determined that Pullman abstention was appropriate. 72 Given that the plaintiffs would need to bring the state law claims before the state court system, certification would offer none of its usual advantages. Indeed, certification in this case might have been more inefficient-inasmuch as it
likely would have involved the state's highest court answering a state
law question in the abstract and then later hearing an appeal of the same
issues brought by the same plaintiffs.
Federal courts' doctrine creates another situation in which abstention will generally be preferable to certification, namely, when abstention
is mandated under another doctrine. Most prominent amongst the other
abstention doctrines is the Younger doctrine.73 Younger requires federal
courts to abstain when an injunction is sought to stay ongoing criminal
proceedings.7 4 Subsequent decisions extended Younger to cases in which
declaratory judgment was sought, 75 to some cases in which the federal
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

252 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Utah 2003).
Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1281-83.
Id. at 1283.

72.

Id. at 1284-85.

73. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
74. Id.at 41. Note that, unlike Pullman, the Younger doctrine of abstention is not discretionary. Id.
75.
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971).
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plaintiffs brought suit before state criminal proceedings, 76 to civil enforcement cases brought by the state,77 and even to some cases not
brought by the state but which involved important state interests. 78 It
would defy logic for the federal court to certify the state law question
that gave rise to Pullman considerations if another doctrine, such as
Younger or Burford 79 or ColoradoRiver,8 ° would require abstention.
In addition to the limitations imposed by doctrines of federal courts
and federal jurisdiction, a number of pragmatic considerations might lead
a federal court to abstain rather than to certify. A federal court might note
that parallel proceedings in state court already exist, such that it would be
inefficient and cumbersome to certify a question to the state's highest
court when there is already a case working its way through the state court
system that will present the same issue to the state's highest court with a
full factual record and without any of the disadvantages of certification.
Alternatively, a federal court might decide that questions of state law are
so predominant that abstention would actually be more efficient. 81 Finally, a federal court might decide that the state law question is so fact intensive that the state court would be unable to provide a fair and reasoned answer without its own fact-finding trial procedure.
A federal court may also be limited by the certification rules of the
state whose law is in question. Certification procedures vary from state to
state. In California, for example, a federal district court may not certify
questions of state law to the California Supreme Court; the California
Rules of Court provide for certification of questions only from "the United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court
of last resort of any state, territory, or commonwealth., 82 The Delaware
Supreme Court Rules prohibit that state's highest court from accepting a

76.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975). But see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
77. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1987).
79.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943) (requiring abstention where a complex state administrative scheme that is overseen by the state courts presents a better forum for
adjudicating the case at issue in the federal court).
80. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976)
(creating a narrow exception to the general rule that pendant proceedings in state court do not bar
related proceedings in federal court).
81.
In a federal question case, these additional state law issues would likely be brought in by
the parties' use of supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). See, e.g., Shegog v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 194 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1999). In that case, discussed in Part IlI.G,
infra, the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal involving one federal claim and many state law claims. Id.
at 837. The Seventh Circuit abstained, rather than certifying, but the court's reasoning deviated from
the Arizonansfor Official English framework, inasmuch as the court justified not certifying because
it feared that this would "short-circuit" the process of decision by state courts. Id. at 840. If, however, the Seventh Circuit had emphasized that certification was less appropriate than abstention, because abstention might actually be more efficient for litigants and the courts, then it would have been
consistent with the holding and reasoning of Arizonans.
82.

CAL. R. CT. 8.548.
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certified question where any of the material facts are in dispute.83 And
one state, North Carolina, does not provide for any certification of questions to its highest court. 84 Furthermore, many states' certification procedures give the state's highest court the discretion whether to accept the
certified question. 85 Consequently, a federal court may correctly certify a
question, only to have the highest state court decline to answer. In these
situations, where certification is unavailable because of state certification
rules or because of a state court's exercise of its discretion, a federal
court considering Pullman abstention should either abstain or decide the
state law issue on its own.
mI. WHEN Do COURTS ABSTAIN AND WHEN Do THEY CERTIFY?

As the previous sections have shown, federal courts considering
Pullman abstention should certify a question of state law rather than abstain. This section analyzes when they actually certify instead of abstain.
Of course, a court may decide to abstain or decide the legal issue itself if
it relies upon case-specific reasons-such as those discussed in the previous section-that make certification less attractive or feasible than
abstention. An examination of federal case law since Arizonans for Official English reveals, however, that most circuits' practices do not conform neatly to these rules. Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit,
have endeavored to follow the guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Other circuits, however, have seemed less concerned with the
intent of Arizonans and have either applied an inconsistent approach to
these cases or have generally preferred abstention to certification.
This section details the varied approaches taken by different circuits, with attention to the structure and reasoning employed by the various courts of appeals as they assess whether to abstain or certify. The
following catalogue of cases includes descriptions of nearly every case
decided since Arizonans for Official English in which a federal appellate
court has abstained or certified a question of state law in a case involving
Pullman considerations. The cases are organized by circuit and in chronological order within each circuit. This list does not include cases involving questions of law from states that, at the time the case was de83. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41(b).
84. See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 7 1.
85.
See, e.g., DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41(b) ("Certification will be accepted in the exercise of the
discretion of the Court only where there exist important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination by this Court of the questions certified."); HAW. R. App. 13(a):
When a federal district or appellate court certifies to the Hawai'i Supreme Court that
there is involved in any proceeding before it a question concerning the law of Hawai'i
that is determinative of the cause and that there is no clear controlling precedent in the
Hawai'i judicial decisions, the Hawai'i Supreme Court may answer the certified question
by written opinion.
OR. R. APP. P. 12.20(3) ("The Supreme Court will consider whether to accept a question certified to
it without oral or written argument from the parties unless otherwise directed by the Supreme
Court."); see also Cochran, supra note 51, at 176 (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court often declines
to explain its exercise of its discretion when deciding not to answer certified questions).
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cided, did not have certification procedures in place. I have also omitted
a handful of unpublished cases that did not add any depth or information
that was not ascertainable through other cases.
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has employed several different
approaches in determining whether to certify in cases involving Pullman
considerations. 86 At times, the court has left the decision completely
within the discretion of the lower court, while at other times it has directed the district court to certify, even going so far as to provide the
exact question that the district court must certify. In other cases, the First
Circuit has found abstention appropriate, relying on pragmatic factors
such as the existence of parallel proceedings in state court.
In Romero v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico,87 the First Circuit held that the district court should have stayed the case and certified a
question of law to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 88 The case presented a First Amendment challenge to the Puerto Rico Bar Association's use of mandatory membership dues to purchase group life insurance for members. 89 It involved Pullman considerations because it was
unclear whether, under the state law governing the bar association, the
association had the authority to purchase life insurance using member
dues. 90 The First Circuit directed the district court to certify to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, relying upon the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Arizonans, and provided the specific question that the
lower court should certify. 91 The court noted that certification was especially appropriate in this case because it would "recognize[]" the role that
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico played in regulating the bar.92
In Laffey v. Begin,93 the First Circuit took another approach to the
issue of whether to abstain or certify. In a First Amendment challenge to
86.
For a description of Pullman considerations, see supra note 16.
87.
204 F.3d 291 (1st Cir. 2000).
88.
Id. at 304-05.
89.
Id. at 293:
Romero argued that being compelled to purchase life insurance violated his First
Amendment rights in two senses. First, noting that compelled membership in a bar association infringes on his freedom of association, he claimed that Puerto Rico's interests in
promulgating the statutory purposes of the bar may be sufficient to overcome his interest
in not being compelled to associate and pay dues, but only in support of activities germane to the bar's legitimate purposes. Mandatory purchase of life insurance as a condition of bar membership does not, he argued, meet this germaneness test. Second, he
stated that he believes in a free-market economy and is opposed to government-sponsored
social programs, especially for those who are not indigent. Thus, the mandatory life insurance provision is contrary to his political philosophy, and he objects to this nonincidental expenditure on ideological grounds.
90.
Id. at 293, 305.
91.
Id. at 305.
92.
Id.
93.
137 F. App'x 362 (1 st Cir. 2005).
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Rhode Island's election contributions law, the court found that the case
involved Pullman considerations and noted that the parties to the lawsuit
had agreed that the questions of state law "should be answered as expeditiously as possible by the state supreme court." 94 The First Circuit left to
the district court's discretion the decision of whether to abstain or certify,
but suggested that the district court should first consider whether an appeal of the state administrative agency's decision at issue could be taken
directly to the state supreme court. 95 The court continued: "If such review is not available and other conventional routes to the state court appear for any reason to be precluded, the district court may certify the
96
appropriate state law questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court."
While this section of the opinion is dicta, the court appeared to suggest
that certification should be the last choice, only to be resorted to if a case
could not be brought in state court. This, of course, contravenes Arizonans for Official English, which emphasized that courts should certify
whenever possible and only resort to abstention when certification procedures were unavailable.
Finally, in Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vildt, 97 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Pullman abstention was appropriate, in large
part because "arguments virtually identical to those presented here had
been presented to the courts of Puerto Rico even before this suit was
filed, and these are now pending before the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico." 98 The court also noted that abstention was appropriate under the
Colorado River doctrine, a doctrine that, in very limited circumstances,
"permit[s] the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration." 99 The
case involved a constitutional challenge to correctional procedures and
involved several regulations and questions of law that the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico had not had an opportunity to decide. 1° While the parallel
state proceedings and the applicability of Colorado River abstention
made the case a strong candidate for abstention rather than certification,
the opinion does not mention certification as a possibility, let alone analyze the relative merits of certification and abstention in the case.
B. Second Circuit
Shortly after Arizonans for Official English was decided, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a pair of opinions that provided a
rigorous and thorough analytical framework for deciding whether to ab-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
Id.
438 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id. at 61.
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
Rivera-Feliciano,438 F.3d at 60-62.
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stain or certify. The Second Circuit's case law is clear and relatively consistent on the issue.
In Tunick v. Safir,10 1 the Second Circuit provided a thoughtful analysis of when, in a Pullman case, a court should certify rather than abstain. The case involved a First Amendment challenge to state law prohibiting public nudity, brought by a photographer who wished to stage a
photo shoot involving "75 to 100 nude models arranged in an abstract
formation" on a city street. 10 2 Writing for a Second Circuit panel, Judge
Calabresi noted that:
Arizonans made quite clear that, in the eyes of the Supreme Court,
the device of certification provides all the benefits of Pullman abstention (deference in a federal system to state courts on questions of
state law and statutory interpretations that avoid constitutional10 3difficulties), while reducing greatly its drawbacks (delay and cost).
Judge Calabresi's opinion also noted, though, that Arizonans does
not require a federal court to certify whenever there is a federal constitutional challenge to a state law that is unclear or has not yet been interpreted by the state's highest court. The opinion pointed to two "right to4
die" cases that the Supreme Court decided shortly after Arizonans.'0
Those two cases-Washington v. Glucksberg10 5 and Vacco v. Quill1 6 involved federal constitutional challenges to state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Both cases presented Pullman considerations and
an opportunity to certify: a federal challenge to state laws that had yet to
be construed by the states' highest courts and that could be avoided by
narrowing constructions.'0 7 In his analysis of these cases, Judge Calabresi emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court reached the merits of the
challenges "despite the concession of the parties that, under certain interpretations, the statutes would avoid constitutional challenge."' 1 8 The opinion explained this apparent inconsistency by looking to the federalism
values that underlie both certification and abstention: Arizonans for Official English concerned "the very manner in which Arizona was to carry
out the basic functions of state governance," while the right
to die cases
'' 9
did not implicate "core functions of state governments." 0
Judge Calabresi concluded that Arizonans and the right to die cases
"in no way lessen the significance of [the] Pullman factors" when deter-

101.

209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000).

102.
103.

Id.at 68.
Id. at 73.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 74.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
Tunick, 209 F.3d at 74.
Id.
Id.at 77.
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mining whether to certify." 0 Rather, Arizonans and the right to die cases
"put a gloss" on the Pullman factors and point to "other factors that are
relevant to the question of certification.""' The opinion explained that a
federal court considering whether to certify "in federal constitutional
litigation involving state statutes" should "look first to the Pullman doctrine for guidance."' 12 The court explained: "This is so because, although
Pullman abstention involves problems that certification may avoid or
reduce, it still remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to
that of certification in cases concerning the federal constitutional validity
of state laws." ' 13 After extensive analysis, the opinion concluded:
The composite lesson of all these cases is that there are at least six
factors that must be considered in deciding whether certification is
justified. They are (1)the absence of authoritative state court interpretations of the state statute, (2) the importance of the issue to the
state and the likelihood that the question will recur, (3) the presence
of serious constitutional difficulties that could be avoided by a possible interpretation of the statute, (4) the capacity of certification to resolve the litigation and either to render federal constitutional decisions unnecessary or to ensure that they are inescapably before the
federal court, (5) the federalism implications of a decision by the federal courts and in particular whether a decision by the federal judiciary potentially interferes with core matters of state sovereignty, and
(6) the effect of the delay entailed by certification on the asserted

rights at issue.14
Based on its application of these factors to the case at hand, the
Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals
relating to the construction of the state's public nudity statute." 5 The
Second Circuit determined that: (1) the New York Court of Appeals had
not interpreted the statutory provision at issue;" 6 (2) the constitutional
issue was "grave," noting in particular, the "tortured issue of the level of
protection ...[for] artistic or expressive nudity"; 1 7 (3) a construction of
the state statute that could avoid the constitutional issue was plausible;' 1 8
(4) certification would either completely resolve the case or resolve all
issues but the constitutional issue; 119 (5) federal courts were taking a
more active role than customary in reviewing city actions due to the
"heavy stream of First Amendment litigation generated by New York
City in recent years," and certification might relieve some of the tension
110.

Id. at 75.

111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 74.

113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.at81.
Id.at89.

116.

Id.at81.

117.
118.

Id.
Id.at84.

119.

Id.at85.
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resulting from the federal courts' oversight;' 20 and (6) the decision to
certify would be "the least harmful alternative" in terms of delay. 121 Tunick remains the most thorough and rigorous analysis to date of whether
a court should certify a question of state law in a case involving Pullman
considerations.
A year later, faced with another case involving Pullman considerations, the Second Circuit again chose to certify the state law issues to the
New York Court of Appeals. 122 In Allstate Insurance Company v. Serio,123 several insurance companies brought a First Amendment challenge to a New York law limiting their ability to make referrals to insured parties. 124 The opinion, also authored by Judge Calabresi, generally
followed the framework established in Tunick, although it did not address each of the Tunick factors. 125 The opinion also forged some new
ground. It held that, in a Pullman case where the court certified a question and the state court declined to answer the certified question, "this
court, once having given the state a first shot at reading its law, has full
latitude to interpret the relevant state law.' 26 The Second Circuit noted
an additional factor weighing in favor of certification: just as in Arizonans for Official English, the state attorney general
in Serio had argued a
27
saving construction of the statute was possible.
In Nicholson v. Scoppetta,128 the Second Circuit heard a constitutional challenge to the City of New York's practice of removing children
from the custody of a parent who had been a victim of domestic violence. 129 The court recognized family law disputes as an area of "traditional state concern," and noted that both a concern for federal-state comity, and the fact that this was an area in which the state courts were particularly knowledgeable, weighed in favor of certification. 30 The court
further noted that the state law was ambiguous,' 31 and that the constitutional challenges were complex but could be avoided by a particular interpretation of the state law.' 3 2 The court relied on both Pullman and
Arizonans for Official English as it reached its conclusion that certification was the appropriate course. 33 It did not rely explicitly upon the Tu-

120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 88.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).

123.

Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 168.
Id.at 169.
Id. at 171-76.
Id. at 167-68.

144.
149-54.
153 n.14.
153.
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nick framework, but the analysis in this case is not at odds with that
framework.
C. Third Circuit
Since Arizonansfor Official English, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has heard few cases involving Pullman abstention or requests to
certify. Consequently, the Third Circuit does not have a well-developed
doctrine to guide judges in deciding whether to abstain or certify.
In Philadelphia City Council v. Schweiker,134 the Third Circuit reviewed a lower court's decision to abstain in a case involving a constitutional challenge to a state agency's decision to take over the Philadelphia
school district. 135 The Schweiker court made no mention of certification
as it reviewed the district court's decision to abstain.
In Afran v. McGreevey, 36 the Third Circuit heard a constitutional
challenge to the New Jersey governor's decision to delay the effective
date of his resignation. 137 The court found that Pullman abstention would
be inappropriate, but emphasized that certification was also inappropriate
for the same reason: the relative clarity of state law. 38 The court also
noted that its analysis was informed by consideration
of "timing, feasibil139
forum."'
of
choice
plaintiffs'
and
policy,
ity, public
D. Fourth Circuit
Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
heard few cases involving Pullman considerations in the years since Ari4°
zonans for Official English. In a 2003 case, PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman,'
the Fourth Circuit heard a case challenging an amendment to a Virginia
14
law criminalizing sale of certain sexually explicit materials to youth. '
The statute had been litigated extensively prior to the amendment at issue
in the case.142 In the prior litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court had certified
43
multiple questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Without citing Pullman, the Fourth Circuit also chose to certify several
questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. This omission is
troubling. While citing to Pullman might seem like an unnecessary formality to some, the Pullman decision, and the analysis it supports, should
be at the foundation of any discussion about whether to certify for Pullman reasons. As the Second Circuit explained in Tunick, courts consider134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

40 F. App'x 672 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 674.
115 F. App'x 539 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543.
317 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2003).

141.

Id. at 415.

142.
143.

Id. at415-18.
Id. at 416.
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ing certification should look to Pullman for guidance because "it still
remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to that of certification in cases concerning the federal constitutional validity of state
laws."' 144 Arizonans for Official English did not supplant Pullman;
in45
Pullman."
by
provided
guidance
the
on
gloss"
a
"put
merely
stead, it
Nevertheless, it does appear that the Fourth Circuit relied upon a
Pullman-type justification in its decision to certify: "Ascertaining the
scope of the [state] law's coverage and what compliance measures would
preclude conviction is necessary for resolution not only of the First
Amendment claim, but also for resolution of the Dormant Commerce
Clause claim."' 146 The Fourth Circuit cited Arizonans as it explained its
decision to certify, and emphasized that when a federal tribunal considers
invalidating a state statute that the state's 47highest court has yet to interpret, the federal court should tread lightly.
E. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has tended to avoid certification
in favor of abstention. It has also overlooked both options in some cases,
even when construing state laws that involve core state functions and that
are being challenged on federal constitutional grounds.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee, 14 8 the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision
to abstain under the Pullman doctrine. 149 The court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion and had not erred in abstaining. 50 As part of its analysis, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the
district court had erred in not certifying the state law issue to the Supreme Court of Texas. While the Fifth Circuit cited Arizonans and noted
that certification was likely more efficient, it nonetheless concluded that
abstention was preferable to certification because other insurance companies were currently litigating the state law issues in Texas's state
courts.15' The court therefore concluded "that the Supreme Court of Texas would be better suited to answer this question with the benefit of
records generated in state court by several insurance companies than it

144. Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2000).
145. Id. at 75:
Given the shared goals of Pullman abstention and of the device of certification, the factors counseling the former are also suggestive of when the latter is desirable. As a result,
Arizonans, Quill, and Glucksberg in no way lessen the significance of these Pullman factors. They do, however, put a gloss on them, while also pointing to other factors that are
relevant to the question of certification.
146. PSINet, 317 F.3d at 422-23.
147. Id. at 424.
148. 283 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 652.
150. Id. at 657.
151.
Id. at 656-57.
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would be by receiving a certified
' 52question from one insurer with a relatively limited record on appeal."'
In a 2005 habeas case, Gomez v. Dretke,153 the Fifth Circuit abstained based on Pullman and other prudential considerations. The case
involved a request by a prisoner to stay his habeas appeal so that he
154
could seek remedies in state court that had recently become available.
The court did not discuss certification, but certification would not have
addressed all of the concerns at work in the case. Most notably, certification would not address the court's desire to allow the state prisoner the
opportunity to litigate his claims in the state system in light of the possibility of new relief.
In 2006, the Fifth Circuit heard Centerfor Individual Freedom v.
Carmouche,'55 a First Amendment challenge to Louisiana's Campaign
Finance Disclosure Act. 156 The court construed the Act "in a way that
save[d] it from constitutional infirmity."'' 57 It did not, however, abstain or
certify to allow the state courts to construe the Act. The dissent argued
that "[t]he majority erred in refusing to certify the res nova state law
questions implicated in the interpretation of the CFDA to the Louisiana
Supreme Court."' 5 8 The dissent further argued that the case involved core
state functions, namely the promotion of "genuinely democratic elections
influto fill its major public offices free from corruption and other undue
59
appropriate.1
more
the
all
certification
made
this
that
and
ences,"
F. Sixth Circuit
In the years immediately following Arizonans for Official English,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals tended to abstain without addressing
whether certification was appropriate. While the Sixth Circuit was slow
to adopt certification, it now routinely certifies questions of state law to
the state court in cases involving Pullman considerations, although it
often does so without reference to Pullman or discussion of abstention.
For the reasons discussed above, acknowledgment of and reference to the
courts as they determine
Pullman doctrine provides valuable guidance to
60
whether certification is the appropriate action.
In 1998, the Sixth Circuit heard Slyman v. City of Willoughby,' 6' a
case involving a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance. 62 The
152.
153.

Id. at 656-57.
422 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005).

154.

Id. at 265.

155.
156.

449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 658.

Id. at 664.
157.
Id. at 672.
158.
Id. at 669. The majority opinion does not address the dissent's arguments that abstention
159.
or certification would have been more appropriate. See id. at 666.
160.
161.

See, e.g., Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2000).
134 F.3d 372, 1998 WL 24990 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
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63
court found that abstention under both the Pullman and Thibodaux'
1
64
doctrines was appropriate. The Thibodaux doctrine suggests abstention
is appropriate in cases that involve particularly sensitive matters relating
to "sovereign prerogative," especially where the issue somehow touches
upon "the apportionment of governmental powers" between local and
state-wide authorities.' 65 While it did not discuss the possibility of certification, the decision to abstain rather than certify might have been due
to the necessity of abstaining under the Thibodaux doctrine.

That same year, the Sixth Circuit decided Gottfried v. Medical
Planning Services, Inc.,166 a federal First Amendment challenge to a
state-court-issued injunction that prohibited protesters from congregating
outside of an abortion clinic.1 67 The court gave a reasoned and thoughtful
explanation as to the appropriateness of abstention to address the Pullman concerns in this case:
Abstention is the proper course here because the state court, unlike
the federal court, can modify its injunction or narrowly construe it in
light of any intervening legal developments. Giving the state court
the first opportunity to reassess the injunction in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions ... is the most efficient way to decide this
168
case.
While the opinion did not directly address whether certification was an
option, this analysis of the parallel proceedings thoroughly supports the
court's conclusion that abstention provided the best response to the issues present in the case.
In Brown v. Tidwell,169 the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision to abstain in a case involving a challenge to a state practice of
collecting "jail fees.' 170 The court did not discuss certification, nor did it
offer any explanation that showed abstention to be particularly appropriate in the case.
In Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 17' a challenge to
Michigan's "partial birth abortion" law, the Sixth Circuit considered certifying a question relating to the law's meaning to the Michigan Supreme
Court. 72 The case involved a federal constitutional challenge to a state
law, but the Sixth Circuit held that certification-and, presumably, ab162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at *2.
La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
Slyman, 1998 WL 24990, at *2.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
169 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 332.
487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at327-28,343.
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stention-would be inappropriate because the law was not subject to a
narrowing construction that would bring it within the requirements of the
Federal Constitution. 73 While the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided to
neither certify nor abstain, the case is notable because it discusses certifi174
cation, rather than abstention, when faced with Pullman-type issues.
Indeed, the court did not even cite to Pullman; it relied instead on Arizonans for Official English to establish the framework for analyzing
whether to certify. 175
In PlannedParenthoodCincinnatiRegion v. Strickland,1 76 the Sixth
Circuit heard a constitutional challenge to an Ohio law that prohibited
the "off-label" use of the drug commonly known as RU-486.177 After
finding that Pullman considerations were at play (again, without actually
citing to Pullman), the court found certification appropriate.1 78 Notably,
the opinion implied that the decisions whether to abstain or to certify
required the same analysis 179 and that once a court found that either was
appropriate, it should generally choose certification.' 80 Indeed, although
the court initially analyzed whether certification or abstention1 8 was appropriate, the bulk of the analysis dealt solely with certification. '
G. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has only decided a few cases
involving Pullman considerations or certification since Arizonans for
Official English. In Shegog v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 182 a case brought under federal question jurisdiction that involved
primarily state law claims, the court considered certifying the state law
issues to the Illinois courts but ultimately opted for an abstention-like
remedy. 83 The court remanded the case to the district court with instruc-

173.
174.
175.
176.

177.

Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2008).

Id. at 408-09.

178.
Id. at 410-11. The court relied primarily upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), and Arizonans for Official English. Id.
179.
See id.:

Where a statutory interpretation is at issue, the United States Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to employ certification or abstention if the "unconstrued state
statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary which might avoid in whole
or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially
change the nature of the problem."
(emphasis added) (quoting Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 146-47).
180.
See id.
181.
See id. at 410-12. For another case in which the Sixth Circuit has opted for certification
without consideration of the Pullman factors, or, indeed, citation to Pullman, see American Booksellers Foundationfor Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d 443, 444-45,447 (6th Cir. 2009) (certi-

fying the
materials
182.
183.

construction of state law restricting use of the Internet for distribution of sexually explicit
to juveniles).
194 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 840.
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tions to determine whether the federal claim was sound.184 If the claim
was sound, the district court was instructed to "provide appropriate relief
and then either relinquish supplemental jurisdiction ...

or defer further

proceedings until the state courts have had an opportunity to address the
main state-law question."'' 85 If the claim was not sound, the district court
was instructed to dismiss the case and direct the plaintiffs to seek redress
in state court.' 86 The court preferred not to certify the question because it
was concerned that "[c]ertification may present the question in a needlessly abstract way ... or short-circuit the normal process of decision by

the state's intermediate appellate courts.' 87 By definition, certification
involves a question presented in a somewhat abstract manner to the
state's highest court (thus, "short-circuiting" the trial-level and intermediate state courts), but this was the precise procedure endorsed in Arizonans for Official English. The court's deviation from the Arizonans
framework was likely related to its appraisal that the lone federal claim
was weak. However, by not citing this as an explanation for its decision
not to certify, the Seventh
Circuit's decision stands at odds with the Ari88
zonans framework. 1

H. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also heard few cases involving either Pullman or Arizonans for Official English since Arizonans
was decided. The case law is sparse: only one Eighth Circuit case contains any substantive discussion of abstention or certification.
In that case, List v. County of Carroll,189 the Eighth Circuit heard a
challenge to the district court's decision to dismiss claims alleging Missouri state practices violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act.' 90 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on
different grounds than the district court's decision. 19! Although the court
noted that at least some of the claims were appropriate for Pullman abstention,192 its analysis was brief and did not mention the possibility of
certification.
. Ninth Circuit
In the years since Arizonans for Official English, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' Pullman-type cases have been inconsistent and inadequately explained. Many of the court's abstention or certification deci184.

Id.

185.
186.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.

187.

Id.

188.

See supra note 81.

189.

240 F. App'x 155 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

190.

Id. at 156.

191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 157.

2009]

CERTIFICATIONAFTER ARIZONANS

sions go unpublished-a pattern that does not advance the development
of robust and resilient case law or provide guidance to lower courts.
More than any other circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit's approach to
the issue has been inconsistent and poorly reasoned.
In the 1998 case San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco,193 the Ninth Circuit considered a takings challenge to a San Francisco
ordinance regulating hotel rooms. 194 The court abstained after concluding
that the takings question could be avoided by allowing the state courts to
interpret the ordinance at issue. 195 The court did not, however, mention
certification as an option. This may have been because the California
certification rule states that a federal district court may not certify a question of state law to the California Supreme Court; that privilege is limited
to the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts of appeal, or any other state's
court of last resort. 196 However, due to the Ninth Circuit's silence on this
issue in The San Remo Hotel-as well as its other Pullman-type cases
involving questions of California law-it is impossible to know whether
this rule impacted the court's decision. Nor is it possible to discern how a
litigant might induce the Ninth Circuit to certify a question on appeal that
had prompted a district court to abstain based on an unclear question of
California law.
In an unpublished opinion in 2000, Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga,197 the Ninth Circuit
considered an appeal of the district court's decision to abstain pursuant to
Pullman.198 The appellants requested that the circuit court certify the
state law questions. 199 The circuit court addressed this request in two
short sentences: "The decision whether to certify a question of state law
to a state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.
• ..After reviewing the briefs, record, and relevant law in this case, we
conclude that certification to the California Supreme Court is not appropriate.,, 200 The court of appeals held that the lower court had not abused
its discretion in abstaining. That same year, in two other unpublished
cases, the Ninth Circuit reviewed lower court decisions to abstain-both
of which it ultimately upheld-but did not mention certification as an
option in either case. 201

193.
145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998).
194.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1104.
195.
196. CAL. R. CT. 8.548.
197.
210 F.3d 382, 2000 WL 61312 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
198.
Id. at *1.
199.
Id.
Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
200.
201.
Resist the List v. Selecky, 242 F.3d 383, 2000 WL 1507524, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Santa Clara County Corr. Peace Officers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors,
225 F.3d 663, 2000 WL 734387, at *2 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
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In a lengthy opinion examining the legality of a city ordinance regulating rental housing, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Columbia Basin
202
Apartment Association v. City of Pasco that Pullman abstention was
appropriate as applied to some of the plaintiffs, and that Younger abstention was appropriate for the remaining plaintiffs.0 3 Although the plaintiffs in Columbia Basin suggested certification as an alternative to abstention, the majority opinion did not address their request. 20 4 However,
the dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that Younger and Pullman abstention applied to the parties in this case and suggested that a
"better course of action would be... to certify
the doubtful questions of
2 05
state law to the Washington Supreme Court.,
In an unpublished opinion from 2002, Fetish & Fantasy Halloween
Ball, Inc. v. Ahern Rentals, Inc.,°206 the Ninth Circuit found that Pullman
abstention was appropriate for a question involving the constitutionality
of a Nevada prejudgment attachment statute. 0 7 While the court did not
discuss whether certification would have been available in the case, it did
note that abstention was particularly appropriate because there was already a "pending state-court action between [the parties that] provide[d]
an opportunity
for the Nevada courts to construe the attachment sta, ,20 8
tute.
In another opinion from 2002, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District,No. 1,209 a Ninth Circuit panel decided
to certify a question regarding whether a school district's use of race to
assign students to different schools violated Washington's antidiscrimination statute. 2 1 Although the court did not reference the Pullman decision, the case clearly involved Pullman considerations inasmuch as the Ninth Circuit was motivated to certify the question so as to
"avoid making federal constitutional decisions unless and until necessary."' 21 The case had been before the Ninth Circuit previously, 2 12 and
while the analysis as to whether to certify was brief (and contained no
mention of Pullman or abstention), its brevity may have been due to the
panel's familiarity with the details and extensive history of the case.

202.

268 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 794.
See id. at 805.
Id. at 810 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
45 F. App'x 585 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.

209.

294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002).

210. Id. at 1086-87. This case has a lengthy procedural history. The Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the Ninth Circuit's substantive constitutional holdings in 2007. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007).
211.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 294 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Clark v. City of Lakewood,
259 F.3d 996, 1016 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001)).

212.

Id. at 1086.
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In an unpublished 2004
Lueck v. Nevada JudicialEthics &
• decision,
•
213
Election Practices Commission, a Ninth Circuit panel found that the
plaintiff likely did not have standing and remanded the case "with instructions to dismiss [the plaintiffs] complaint without prejudice to any
right he may have to seek review by the Nevada Supreme Court. ' 14 The
court reasoned that whether the plaintiffs had standing turned on a question of state law, a determination the court considered a proper basis for
Pullman abstention. 215 Nowhere in the opinion, however, did the court
mention the option of certification.
In Smelt v. County of Orange,21 6 a challenge to California's law
prohibiting same-sex marriage, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court had not abused its discretion when it abstained 2. 7 At issue was
whether the California law violated the California Constitution and the
U.S. Constitution .2188 The court did not address certification as an option.
However, in its analysis, the court emphasized that abstention was particularly appropriate in this case because very similar cases were pending
in the 2state
court system and were likely to reach the California Supreme
19
-

Court.

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to a city's practice of denying health insurance to former employees.22 0 In Doyle v. City
of Medford,22 a group of retirees alleged that the city's practice violated
222
Oregon law and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The plaintiffs' due process claim was based on the contention that Oregon law conferred on them a property interest in health insurance benefits during their retirement. 223 The Ninth Circuit noted an ambiguity in
the Oregon statute at issue that had not been interpreted or resolved by
the Oregon courts. 22 4 The Ninth Circuit, in deciding to certify, wrote
simply: "without guidance from the Oregon Supreme Court about what
the [ambiguous] phrase ...

means in this context or ...[what] the legis-

lature intended, we are unable to decide the federal constitutional question accurately., 225 Interestingly, the court then cited Oregon case law
governing certification of questions from federal courts to the Oregon
Supreme Court and noted that one factor bearing on the certification decision is whether the issues in the case "could implicate the doctrine of
213.

106 F. App'x 552 (9th Cir. 2004).

214.
215.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 554.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 686.
ld. at 676-77.
Id. at 681.
Doyle v. City of Medford, 565 F.3d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.

222.
223.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.

224.

Id. at 541.

225.

Id. at 542.
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'Pullman abstention. ' ' ' 226 The court devoted considerable space to its
discussion of whether Pullman factors were at play in this caseultimately concluding that they were-and relied on both Arizonans for
Official English and an Oregon case for the proposition that certification
would avoid many of the inefficiencies associated with abstention.227
This analysis, while thorough, was misplaced. To analyze the appropriateness of abstention and certification, along with the relative merits
of each, only after having decided to certify, puts the cart before the
horse. The court presents its analysis of abstention in an attempt to persuade the Oregon Supreme Court to accept and answer the certified question, without using any of this analysis to support its initial decision to
seek state court guidance. 8
J. Tenth Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has heard relatively few
cases involving Pullman considerations since Arizonansfor Official English, it has provided one well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion that
discusses when to certify and when to abstain.
Kansas Judicial Review v. Stou?2 9 involved a First Amendment
challenge to the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct canon that prohibits
judicial candidates from making certain types of campaign pledges.2 3 °
The Tenth Circuit chose to certify the "important and unsettled questions
of state law" underlying the claim to the Kansas Supreme Court. 231 In
deciding to certify, the court first looked to whether the case was an appropriate candidate for Pullman abstention.232 Without coming to any
firm conclusions as to whether the case justified abstention, the court
noted the problems inherent in abstention-especially the effect of abstention-related delay in First Amendment cases-and the Supreme
Court's expression of a preference for certification, rather than abstention.2 33 It endorsed certification as "consistent with our duties to avoid
passing on the constitutionality of a statute where possible," especially
when it is a state statute that has yet to be interpreted by the state's highest court. 234 The court concluded that the decision to certify rests within a
federal court's discretion, but that "where statutory interpretation is at
issue, the touchstone of our certification inquiry is whether the state sta226. Id. at 543 (citing W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630
(Or. 1991)).
227. Id. at 543-44 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997);
W. Helicopter Servs., Inc., 811 P.2d at 632).
228. Id. at 543 ("We recognize that the court takes into account several discretionary factors
when deciding whether to accept a question for certification.").
229. 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008).
230.
Id. at II11.
231.

Id.

232.
233.
234.

Id. at 1118-19.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
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tute is readily susceptible of an interpretation that 'would avoid or' 235
substatute.'
the
to
challenge
constitutional
federal
the
modify
stantially
K. Eleventh Circuit
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
heard few cases involving Pullman considerations since Arizonans for
Official English was decided. The circuit's sole opinion dealing with the
question of when to certify rather than abstain, however, provides an
accessible and detailed framework to guide lower courts.
In Pittman v. Cole,236 the Eleventh Circuit considered a First
Amendment challenge to the "enforcement of advisory opinions promulgated by the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Alabama
State Bar's Office of General Counsel" that would have prevented judicial candidates from answering election-related questionnaires. 3 7 The
district court had abstained under the Pullman doctrine. 238 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the decision to abstain was erroneous, even as it
noted that "the district court was correct in recognizing that unsettled
issues of state law could well shape if not moot the plaintiffs' federal
constitutional claims. ' 239 Though the case involved Pullman considerations, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider several prudential factors, including "'delay,
cost, doubt as to the adequacy of state procedures[,] ...the existence of
factual disputes, and [whether] the case has already been in litigation for
a long time,"' as well as the type of claim at issue.240 The court emphasized that Pullman abstention would rarely be appropriate in cases involving First Amendment challenges because delay is particularly injurious to First Amendment rights. 24 The Eleventh Circuit then remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to certify the questions of
state law to the Alabama Supreme Court. 242 In so doing, it emphasized
that where abstention might have proven "problematic," certification
simplified the analysis and allowed the federal court to request clarification from state courts.243
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: TWO APPROACHES TO PROPER CERTIFICATION

The inconsistency within and across the circuits has created a confusing backdrop for litigants and for lower courts considering whether to
certify a question of state law in cases involving a federal constitutional
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976)).
267 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1273, 1276.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1286-87 (quoting Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 1290.
Id.
at 1291.
Id. at 1290.
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challenge to a state law. The Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans for
Official English made clear that lower courts must, at a very minimum,
consider certification when they otherwise would have abstained under
Pullman. Arizonans did not, however, provide an analytical framework
to guide lower courts as they determine whether to abstain, to certify, or
to decide for themselves the state law issues. As the previous section
shows, certain circuits-most notably the Second Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit-have developed a clear, coherent framework for determining whether to abstain or certify. Other circuits, such
as the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, have failed to provide a consistent, thorough, and transparent approach to this issue. This inconsistency
is problematic for numerous reasons. Here, however, I simply note that
dramatic inconsistencies can lead to unfair results and,
just as important244
ly, a public perception of arbitrary decision-making.

In this section, I suggest two approaches to deciding whether to abstain or certify in Pullman-type cases. Both approaches are consistent
with the Supreme Court's cases on the issue of certification in cases involving federal constitutional challenges to state laws. The first approach, derived from the Second Circuit's cases, combines the Pullman
doctrine with recent certification decisions from the Supreme Court to
create a list of factors that each court should consider as it determines
whether certification or abstention is appropriate. The second approach is
a two-step analysis that modifies the Second Circuit framework by
breaking the inquiry into two separate prongs.
A. The Tunick Analysis
The first approach involves the framework devised by Judge Calabresi in Tunick v. Safir.245 In Tunick, Judge Calabresi emphasized that,

244.

See Stephen B. Burbank, JudicialIndependence, JudicialAccountability, and Interbranch

Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 915 (2007):

Research suggests that diffuse support [of the courts] is linked to legitimizing messages
about the courts, such as those that highlight the role of precedent and the rule-of-law
ideal, and that it is adversely affected by delegitimizing messages, such as those that
frame court decisions simply in terms of results (for example, the message that Bush v.
Gore decided the 2000 election).
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential FederalAppellate Opinions: A Case
Study of the Substantive Due ProcessState-CreatedDanger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 217, 217 (2006):

Doctrinal divergence between the Third Circuit's binding and non-precedential opinions
has undermined the predictive value of precedential state-created danger decisions, creating an obstacle to settlement at both the trial and appellate levels. In turn, district courts'
unpredictable application of the non-precedential opinions has undermined the critical
appellate functions of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, that judicial decisions are
not arbitrary, and that legal issues resolved at the appellate level need not be relitigated
before the district courts.
See also Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on
Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 423, 432-35 (1986) (describing
normative objections to judicial inconsistency).
245. 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000).
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though Arizonans for Official English should be read as instructing the
use of certification "in more instances than had previously been thought
appropriate," Arizonans does not hold that a court "must certify whenever (a) a plaintiff raises a federal constitutional challenge to state law in
federal court, (b) the state's highest court has not interpreted the statute,
and (c) the constitutional question could conceivably be avoided by some
saving interpretation. '246 His opinion concluded that any discussion of
the appropriateness of certification in federal constitutional challenges to
state statutes must rely on Pullman "for guidance,, 247 and that, "[g]iven
the shared goals of Pullman abstention and of the device of certification,
the factors counseling the former are also suggestive of when the latter is
desirable. 24 8 Arizonans for Official English and the Second Circuit's
right-to-die cases, Judge Calabresi reasoned, add a "gloss" to the Pullman factors, but do not undermine or displace the Pullman analysis.249
From these various strands of case law, Judge Calabresi produces
six factors that a court should consider when determining whether to
certify a case involving federal constitutional challenges to state law: (1)
whether the state statute has already been interpreted by the state's highest court; (2) how important the issue is and whether it is likely to recur;
(3) whether serious constitutional issues may be avoided by certain interpretations of the state statute; (4) the extent to which certification would
"render federal constitutional decisions unnecessary or ...ensure that

they are inescapably before the federal court"; (5) whether the state law
issue implicates core issues of state governance and how a potential federal decision would impact federalism concerns; and (6) how the certification-related delay would impact the claimed federal rights.25 °
These six factors will clarify whether certification is the appropriate
action or whether the federal court should instead construe the state statute without certifying a question to the state court. The Tunick analysis
convincingly adapts the Supreme Court's cases into an accessible sixfactor test that, if uniformly applied by federal appellate courts, would
impose much-needed consistency in this area of law. What these six factors do not explicitly address are those situations in which certification
may be appropriate, but, for reasons addressed in Part II of this article,
abstention may be even more appropriate. In other words, the Tunick
analysis does not account for instances in which the federal court should
seek state court guidance, but where certification is unavailable or inappropriate because of doctrinal reasons (under Pennhurst other forms of
246. Id. at 73-74.
247. Id. at 74 ("[Alithough Pullman abstention involves problems that certification may avoid
or reduce, it still remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to that of certification in
cases concerning the federal constitutional validity of state laws.").
248. Id. at 75.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 81.
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abstention) or pragmatic reasons (such as the existence of a similar case
pending before the state supreme court).
B. The Two-Step Analysis
The two-step approach would require a court considering certification or abstention to engage in a straightforward two-step analysis: first,
whether the case involves Pullman considerations, and second, whether
any factors exist that weigh against the presumption of certification. Under this approach, a court would first determine whether or not a case
involves Pullman considerations.25 During this first step, the court
would temporarily ignore both the possibility of certification and the
question of whether abstention would be the best option. Instead, the
court would focus solely on the existence of Pullman considerations. A
court would analyze whether there is: (1) a difficult constitutional issue
involving core issues of state governance that (2) could be avoided by a
narrowing construction of a (3) state law that has yet to be construed by
the state's highest court 2 From this analysis, the court will have assessed whether seeking guidance-either certification or abstentionfrom the state courts would be appropriate.
After ascertaining whether the Pullman factors are satisfied, the
court would proceed to determine whether any factors exist that weigh
against the presumption of certification and suggest that the court either
abstain or decide the issue on its own. If any of the prudential or doctrinal considerations discussed in Part II of this article were present, then the
court should balance them with the advantages inherent in certification. 253 For example, a court might decide to abstain, rather than certify,
because the case involves Pennhurstconsiderations that would render the

251.
While I argue here that a court determining whether to certify on Pullman grounds should
first determine whether the threshold requirements for Pullman abstention are met, I do not suggest
that certification is only appropriate if these threshold requirements are met. Indeed, certification is
appropriate in many situations in which abstention would most definitely not be appropriate. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 42, at 1201. This article deals only with the limited set of cases in which
a court is considering Pullman abstention and has the option to certify rather than abstain. In nonPullman certification, a court determining whether to certify should not use the abstention analysis
as its starting point. See Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certificationfrom Abstention in Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 847, 885 (2007) (arguing that certain limitations on abstention are not applicable to certification,
and that courts need not apply principles of abstention when determining whether to certify).
252.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We need not certify
or abstain unless 'the [state] statute is fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question' . . . . Nor are we obliged to avoid
constitutional questions that are not 'serious."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
253. See Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1289 (11 th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing certification's
benefits and finding that certification was appropriate where abstention was not).
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because parallel proceedcourt unable to grant the requested relief,2 54 or
255
ings in the state courts are already under way.
The mere presence of one of the factors outlined in Part II should
not, however, end the inquiry. Whether the existence of a certain factor
should lead the court to abstain, rather than certify, will differ from case
to case. For instance, the presence of parallel state court proceedings
(assuming the inapplicability of Younger) might not justify abstention if
the case involved a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that the
delay that accompanies abstention can cause particular harm to First
Amendment freedoms.256 This result might not be the same in a case that
does not involve the First Amendment. In the end, this analysis is essentially a balancing test: the court must weigh the various pragmatic and
doctrinal considerations and determine, on balance, whether certification
or abstention is more appropriate. Of course, the Supreme Court's statements favoring certification must inform a court's balancing act; in the
end, certification should have a thumb on the scale.
This two-step analysis is not altogether unfamiliar. Indeed, some
courts already employ similar analyses in their approach to cases involving Pullman considerations.257 For instance, in Pittman v. Cole,25 8 the
Eleventh Circuit first determined that, while Pullman factors were
present in the case, factors such as the likely impact of abstention-related
delay and the interim relief granted to plaintiffs made abstention inappropriate. 9 The court then considered certification, noting that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the district court erred by abstaining in the
manner that it did in this case, we agree with it that there exist important
unsettled issues of state law that are likely to shape, alter, or moot the
federal constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs' claims., 260 The court
concluded that certification was appropriate in light of the advantages of
certification, as well as the Supreme Court's endorsement of the procedure in Arizonansfor Official English.26 1

254.
See, e.g., Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1285 (D. Utah 2003) (abstaining under the Pullman doctrine, in part, because the Pennhurst doctrine precluded the court from

addressing the state law claims in the case).
255.

See, e.g., Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vili, 438 F.3d 50, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding

Pullman abstention appropriate because the same issues were pending before the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico as a result of parallel state court proceedings).
256.

See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1119 ("Courts have been particu-

larly reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges on First Amendment grounds.. . in part
because the delay caused by declining to adjudicate the issues could prolong the chilling effect on
speech." (citation omitted)).
257.
And, of course, other courts may be employing this balancing approach without making it
explicit. But if they do not make their reasoning explicit, it is difficult for the case law to develop
and for lower courts to know how they ought to approach the issue.
258.
267 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1285-88.
259.

260.

Id. at 1288.

261.

Id. at 1288-91.
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The two-step test takes after the Tunick analysis inasmuch as it incorporates the six Tunick factors. Both approaches would make clear
whether certification is an appropriate course of action, and both tests
would also bring a consistent analytic approach to this field of law. By
separating the inquiry into two steps, however, the two-step framework
provides more information. As with Tunick, the two-step approach helps
the court determine whether certification is appropriate. But it also helps
the court determine whether certain factors counsel in favor of abstention. It is important to not combine these steps, because the inquiries are
fundamentally different: whether to ask for participation from the state
courts versus how to facilitate state court participation.
The two-step structured analysis has the potential to bring clarity
and even elegance to an area of law that has long been unwieldy and
unnecessarily confusing. Imposing a degree of formality to the analysis
would provide predictability and guidance to lower courts and parties. 262
By following the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizonans for Official English more closely, federal appellate courts would also protect the federalism values embodied in both Arizonans and Pullman. And, perhaps most
relevant to practitioners and litigants, they will ensure that parties are
spared the unnecessary delay and expense involved in abstention that the
Arizonansfor Official English decision sought to eliminate.
CONCLUSION

Certification and abstention play an important role in the complex
and changing relationship between federal and state courts. With certification's rising frequency, abstention under the Pullman doctrine has necessarily waned. As this article has shown, however, the theory and reasoning underlying Pullman abstention remain essential to any analysis of
certification in cases where previously a court would have considered
abstaining under the Pullman doctrine. If the circuit courts are to develop
a coherent and thorough approach to certification in cases where they
previously would have abstained, they must look to Pullman to deter-

262. As discussed supra note 244, inconsistent or unexplained decision-making may result in
arbitrary decisions (or a perception of arbitrariness) and may undermine the legitimacy of the court
system. It also makes the job of federal district courts more difficult. See also Martha J. Dragich,
Will the FederalCourts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions
to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 800
(1995) ("By failing to provide sufficient guidance to lower court judges, summary dispositions,
selective publication practices, and noncitation rules
undermine certainty, predictability, and fidelity
to authority.").
Of course, even with a more formalistic framework, the federal courts retain discretion in
determining whether to certify or abstain. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
501 (1941) ('These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby
the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of the
federal judiciary." (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919); Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935)).
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mine whether to involve the state courts and to Arizonans for Official
English to determine how to seek state court guidance.
Courts considering a Pullman-type case should rely upon the Tunick
framework or adopt the two-step analysis described in Part IV.B. The
latter option is preferable, inasmuch as it addresses not just whether to
seek state court guidance, but also what procedure to use to obtain state
guidance. Nevertheless, both options will ensure compliance with the
Supreme Court's decisions in Pullman and Arizonans for Official English. Following the guidance of these two cases will allow courts to develop a robust body of case law, provide a foundation for clear and thorough analysis, and lead to consistent results that reflect the federalism
values at the heart of both decisions.

